R&D investment has well-known liquidity problems, with potentially important consequences.
Introduction
In this study, we analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare in a Schumpeterian growth model featuring cash-in-advance (CIA) requirements. In the well-established tradition of CIA and economic growth, the CIA constraints appear on consumption and on capital investment, as in the seminal study by Stockman (1981) , further developed by Abel (1985) . In their line of argument, as long as physical capital acquisition has cash requirements, the long-term capital-to-labor ratio is decreased by the nominal interest rate, which acts as a tax on capital. However, existing evidence strongly supports the view that R&D investment is even more severely a¤ected by liquidity requirements 1 than physical capital: for example, Brown and Petersen (2009) …nd 2 that the investment-cash ‡ow sensitivity largely disappears for physical investment, while it remains comparatively strong for R&D. More recently, Aghion et al. (2012) …nd in their data 3 that R&D is more a¤ected by countercyclical monetary policy than physical investment, due to credit and liquidity constraints.
To address this issue in a neat way, we build a scale-free variant of the quality-ladder model a la Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) , which incorporates money demand into the quality-ladder model through a CIA constraint on R&D investment, alongside the more conventional CIA constraints on consumption and manufacturing expenditures. Our main results can be summarized as follows. Under the CIA constraints on consumption and R&D, an increase in the nominal interest rate would decrease R&D and economic growth. This could be partially o¤set by a CIA requirement on manufacturing, whereby an increase in the nominal interest rate may encourage R&D. However, as long as the e¤ect of the CIA constraint on R&D dominates the e¤ect of the CIA constraint on manufacturing, the nominal interest rate would have an overall negative e¤ect on R&D and economic growth, as documented in recent empirical studies, such as Evers et al. (2007) and .
We also analyze the long-run implications on social welfare and compare our results to Friedman's (1969) proposed monetary policy rule, according to which the optimal nominal interest rate should be zero. Since then, a large number of studies has analyzed the optimality of Friedman rule in di¤erent economic environments; see for example, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997) for a discussion on some of the early studies, and Bhattacharya et al. (2005) , Gahvari (2007 Gahvari ( , 2012 and Lai and Chin (2010) for recent contributions. Until recently, a close-to-zero nominal interest rate has been little more than a theoretical possibility, rarely occurring in reality. However, since December 2008, the target range for the federal funds rate in the US has been at zero to 0.25%. In June 2012, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced that it "currently anticipates that economic conditions [...] are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014." 4 Another example is Japan, where the benchmark interest rate has been between zero and 0.1% also since December 2008. In this paper, we …nd that a zero-interest-rate 1 In their empirical survey, Hall and Lerner (2009), state: "The conclusions from this body of empirical work are several: …rst, there is solid evidence that debt is a disfavored source of …nance for R&D investment". 2 In their 1970-2006 US …rm-level data. 3 For 15 industrial OECD countries in the 1995-2005 period. 4 Press Release of the FOMC meeting on June 20, 2012. policy can be suboptimal due to a unique feature of the Schumpeterian model that has been largely ignored in the literature on monetary economics. Speci…cally, we …nd that the suboptimality or optimality of Friedman rule is closely related to a seemingly unrelated issue that is the overinvestment versus underinvestment of R&D in the market economy, and this result is robust to alternative versions of the model. Under inelastic labor supply, Friedman rule is suboptimal (optimal) if and only if the equilibrium is characterized by R&D overinvestment (underinvestment). Under elastic labor supply, R&D overinvestment (underinvestment) becomes necessary (su¢cient) for Friedman rule to be suboptimal (optimal) due to an interaction between the CIA constraints on consumption and R&D investment. Our welfare analysis relates to the R&D-based growth literature. In this literature, whether R&D underinvestment or overinvestment emerges in equilibrium is still an open question. Jones and Williams (2000) show that a calibrated R&D-based growth model is likely to feature R&D underinvestment because the positive externalities associated with R&D dominate the negative externalities. A subsequent study by Comin (2004) shows that this result is based on an assumption in the calibration that domestic total factor productivity (TFP) growth is completely driven by domestic R&D. Then, he …nds that if domestic R&D only drives a small fraction of domestic TFP growth, there would be R&D overinvestment in the economy, which he argues as the more likely scenario according to his simulation results.
We contribute to this literature by incorporating CIA requirements into a standard R&D-driven growth framework with vertical innovation. In a previous attempt, featuring CIA and horizontal innovation, a la Romer (1990), Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) prove the optimality of the Friedman rule in the presence of CIA in the consumption sector. Their crucial assumption is that the "non-cash good" fraction of consumption requires human capital to process transactions. Therefore, an increase in the interest rate, by discouraging the "cash good" consumption, increases the demand for transaction services, thereby reallocating human capital from manufacturing and research into the payment production. This has a negative level e¤ect and a negative growth e¤ect -by reducing human capital input from R&D. Since in Romer's (1990) structure R&D is always sub-optimal, the Friedman rule would be second-best optimal. Unlike their model 5 , which quite unrealistically assumes that liquidity problems are absent in the R&D sector, we here allow for the presence of a CIA constraint in the R&D sector as well, and single out a direct negative e¤ect of a higher nominal interest rate on R&D without the need of any role of human capital in the transaction technology. Moreover, the optimality of a positive nominal interest rate in the present study is driven by the possibility of R&D overinvestment in the Schumpeterian growth model. This property of R&D overinvestment is absent in the neoclassical growth model by construction and also absent in the Romer (1990) model. Finally, Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) considers a …rst-generation R&D-based growth model that features scale e¤ects; in contrast, we examine our results in the two main versions of a scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth model.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the monetary Schumpeterian growth model. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of monetary policy. Section 4 considers alternative versions of the model. The …nal section concludes.
A monetary Schumpeterian growth model
In this section, we present the monetary Schumpeterian growth model. In summary, we modify the quality-ladder model in Grossman and Helpman (1991) by allowing for elastic labor supply and incorporating money demand via CIA constraints on consumption and R&D investment. 6 Furthermore, we allow for population growth and remove scale e¤ects by incorporating a dilution e¤ect on R&D productivity following Laincz and Peretto (2006) . 7 Given that the quality-ladder model has been well-studied, the standard features of the model will be brie ‡y described below to conserve space.
Households
At time t, the population size of each household is N t , and its law of motion is _ N t = nN t , where n 0 is the exogenous population growth rate. There is a unit continuum of identical households, who have a lifetime utility function given by
where c t is per capita consumption of …nal goods and l t is the supply of labor per person at time t. The parameters > 0 and 0 determine respectively subjective discounting and leisure preference. Each household maximizes (1) subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:
a t is the real value of assets owned by each member of households, and r t is the real interest rate. Each member of households supplies labor l t to earn a real wage rate w t . Each person also receives a lump-sum transfer t from the government (or pay a lump-sum tax if t < 0).
t is the in ‡ation rate that determines the cost of holding money, and m t is the real money balance held by each person partly to facilitate purchases of consumption goods. The CIA constraint is given by c t + b t m t , where 2 [0; 1]. 9 b t is the amount of money borrowed from each member of households by entrepreneurs to …nance R&D investment, and the return on b t is i t .
From standard dynamic optimization, we derive a no-arbitrage condition i t = r t + t ; therefore, i t is also the nominal interest rate. The optimality condition for consumption is 6 We consider this version of the model with CIA constraints on consumption and R&D as our benchmark. However, we will also explore the implications of a CIA constraint on manufacturing in an extension of the model; see Section 4.2.
7 In Section 4.3, we consider a semi-endogenous-growth version of the model. See Jones (1999) and Laincz and Peretto (2006) for a discussion of scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth models. 8 Here we assume that the utility function is based on per capita utility. Alternatively, one can assume that the utility function is based on aggregate utility in which case the e¤ective discount rate simply becomes n. 9 The usual CIA constraint on consumption is captured by the special case of = 1; see for example, Wang and Yip (1992) . Here we follow Dotsey and Ireland (1996) to consider a more general setup, and the parameter determines the relative strength of the CIA constraints on consumption and R&D investment.
where t is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2). The optimality condition for labor supply is
and the familiar intertemporal optimality condition is
Final goods
Final goods are produced by competitive …rms that aggregate intermediate goods using a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator given by
where
where p t (j) is the price of x t (j).
Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries producing di¤erentiated intermediate goods. Each industry is temporarily dominated by an industry leader until the arrival of the next innovation, and the owner of the new innovation becomes the next industry leader. 10 The production function for the leader in industry j is
The parameter z > 1 is the step size of a productivity improvement, and q t (j) is the number of productivity improvements that have occurred in industry j as of time t. L x;t (j) is production labor in industry j. Given z qt(j) , the marginal cost of production for the industry leader in industry j is mc t (j) = w t =z qt(j) . It is useful to note that we here adopt a cost-reducing view of vertical innovation as in Peretto (1998) .
Standard Bertrand price competition leads to a pro…t-maximizing price p t (j) determined by a markup = p t (j)=mc t (j) over the marginal cost. In the original Grossman-Helpman model, the patentholder is assumed to have complete protection against imitation such that = z. Li (2001) considers a more general policy environment with incomplete patent protection against potential imitation such that 2 (1; z); see also Goh and Olivier (2002) .
11
Here we follow their formulation to model patent breadth , which also serves as a simple way to separate the markup from the step size z. The amount of monopolistic pro…t is
Finally, production-labor income is
R&D
Denote v t (j) as the value of the monopolistic …rm in industry j. Because t (j) = t for j 2 [0; 1] from (9), v t (j) = v t in a symmetric equilibrium that features an equal arrival rate of innovation across industries. 12 In this case, the familiar no-arbitrage condition for v t is
This condition equates the real interest rate r t to the asset return per unit of asset. The asset return is the sum of (a) monopolistic pro…t t , (b) potential capital gain : v t , and (c) expected capital loss t v t due to creative destruction, where t is the arrival rate of the next innovation.
There is a unit continuum of R&D …rms indexed by k 2 [0; 1]. They hire R&D labor L r;t (k) for innovation. The wage payment for R&D labor is w t L r;t (k); however, to facilitate this wage payment, the entrepreneur needs to borrow money from households subject to the nominal interest rate i t . Therefore, the CIA constraint on R&D gives the monetary authority an ability to in ‡uence the equilibrium allocation of resources across sectors through the nominal interest rate. 13 The zero-expected-pro…t condition of …rm k is
11 Their idea is that without su¢cient strength of patent protection, the presence of monopolistic pro…ts attracts imitation; therefore, stronger patent protection allows monopolistic producers to charge a higher markup without the threat of imitation. 12 We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi et al. (2007) for a theoretical justi…cation for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique rational-expectation equilibrium in the Schumpeterian growth model. 13 Evers et al. (2007) provide empirical evidence that the in ‡ation rate and the nominal interest rate have negative e¤ects on total factor productivity growth via R&D. 14 Here we assume that b t (k) w t L r;t (k), where can be interpreted as the length of time money must be held to …nance R&D; see Feenstra (1985) for a discussion of CIA constraints in continuous time. For now, we normalize to one for simplicity. In Section 4.2, we consider a more general analysis with 2 [0; 1].
where the …rm-level arrival rate of innovation is t (k) = ' t L r;t (k), where ' t = '=N t captures the dilution e¤ect that removes scale e¤ects as in Laincz and Peretto (2006) . 15 Finally, the aggregate arrival rate of innovation is
where we have de…ned l r;t L r;t =N t as R&D labor per capita. Similarly, we will de…ne l x;t L x;t =N t as production labor per capita.
Monetary authority
The nominal money supply is denoted by M t , and its growth rate is _ M t =M t . By de…nition, the aggregate real money balance is m t N t = M t =P t , where P t denotes the price of …nal goods. The monetary policy instrument that we consider is i t because we are interested in analyzing the optimal nominal interest rate. Given an exogenously chosen i t by the monetary authority, the in ‡ation rate is endogenously determined according to t = i t r t . Then, given t , the growth rate of the nominal money supply is endogenously determined according to _ M t =M t = _ m t =m t + t + n. Finally, the monetary authority returns the seigniorage revenue as a lump transfer
Alternatively, one can consider the growth rate of money supply as the policy instrument directly controlled by the monetary authority. Notice that in our economy, the consolidated public sector, by manipulating the changes in money supply via lump-sum transfers to households, is able to control the money growth rate _ M t =M t and hence the nominal interest rate. To see this, by the Fisher equation, i t = r t + t , where t = _ M t =M t g t n. 16 By the Euler equation, r t = + g t + n; 17 therefore, the nominal interest rate is
which is determined by the growth rate of money supply.
Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fc t ; m t ; l t ; y t ; x t (j); L x;t (j); L r;t (k)g and a time path of prices fp t (j); w t ; r t ; i t ; v t g. Also, at each instance of time, households maximize utility taking fi t ; r t ; w t g as given;
competitive …nal-goods …rms produce fy t g to maximize pro…t taking fp t (j)g as given;
monopolistic intermediate-goods …rms produce fx t (j)g and choose fL x;t (j); p t (j)g to maximize pro…t taking fw t g as given;
15 In Section 4.3, we consider an alternative speci…cation given by ' t = '=Z t under which the model becomes a semi-endogenous growth model as in Segerstrom (1998) . 16 It can be shown that on the balanced growth path, m t and c t grow at the same rate. 17 It can be shown that on the balanced growth path, 1= t and c t grow at the same rate.
R&D …rms choose fL r;t (k)g to maximize expected pro…t taking fi t ; w t ; v t g as given;
the market-clearing condition for labor holds such that L x;t + L r;t = l t N t ; the market-clearing condition for …nal goods holds such that y t = c t N t ; the value of monopolistic …rms adds up to the value of households' assets such that v t = a t N t ; and the amount of money borrowed by R&D entrepreneurs is w t L r;t = b t N t .
Substituting (8) into (6), we derive the aggregate production function given by
where aggregate technology Z t is de…ned as
The second equality of (15) applies the law of large numbers. Di¤erentiating the log of (15) with respect to t yields the growth rate of aggregate technology given by
As for the dynamics of the model, Proposition 1 shows that the economy jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path.
Proposition 1 Given a constant nominal interest rate i, the economy immediately jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path along which each variable grows at a constant (possibly zero) rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.
On the balanced growth path, the equilibrium labor allocation is stationary. Imposing balanced growth on (11) yields v t = t =( + ) because _ t = t = g + n and r = g + + n from (5). Substituting this condition into (12) yields t =( + ) = (1 + i)w t L tr , where is given by (13), t is given by (9) and w t is given by (10) . Using these conditions, we derive
which is the …rst equation that solves for fl x ; l r ; lg. The second equation is simply the per capita version of the labor-market-clearing condition given by
To derive the last equation, we substitute (10) into (4) to obtain
Solving (17)- (19), we obtain the equilibrium labor allocation as follows.
Equation (20) shows that R&D labor l r is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i under both elastic labor supply (i.e., > 0) and inelastic labor supply (i.e., = 0). Therefore, economic growth g = (' ln z)l r is also decreasing in i in both cases. This result is consistent with empirical evidence in Chu and Lai (2012), who document a negative relationship between in ‡ation and R&D. In our model, = i r = i g(i)
n; therefore, an increase in i causes an increase in and l x , and a decrease in l r , g and r.
Proposition 2 R&D and economic growth are both decreasing in the nominal interest rate.
Proof. Note (20) and then (16).
Socially optimal allocation
In this subsection, we derive the socially optimal allocation of the model. Imposing balanced growth on (1) yields
where c 0 = Z 0 l x and g = ln z = (' ln z)l r . We normalize the exogenous Z 0 to unity. Maximizing (23) subject to (18) yields the …rst-best allocation denoted with a superscript .
We restrict the parameter space to ensure that l r > 0, which in turn implies that l > 0.
Optimal monetary policy and Friedman rule
In this section, we analyze optimal monetary policy and the optimality of Friedman rule. In Section 3.1, we consider the special case of inelastic labor supply. In Section 3.2, we consider the general case of elastic labor supply. Under elastic labor supply, we consider both cases of the model with and without the CIA constraint on consumption.
Friedman rule under inelastic labor supply
In this subsection, we consider Friedman rule under inelastic labor supply, which is captured by setting = 0. In this case, the equilibrium allocation simpli…es to
and l = 1. From (27) and (28), it is easy to see that R&D labor l r is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i, whereas production labor l x is increasing in i. Furthermore, given the fact that the parameter does not appear in (27) and (28), the CIA constraint on consumption has no e¤ect on l r and l x under inelastic labor supply. In this case, the e¤ect of i operates through the CIA constraint on R&D investment under which an increase in the nominal interest rate increases the cost of R&D and leads to a reallocation of labor from R&D to production. Under inelastic labor supply, the monetary authority may be able to achieve the …rst-best allocation by choosing the optimal nominal interest rate i given by
The inequality i 0 is imposed to respect the zero lower bound of the nominal interest rate. If i = 0, then Friedman rule is optimal, but the monetary authority is unable to achieve the …rst-best allocation (unless i = 0 holds exactly and is not binding). If i > 0, then Friedman rule is suboptimal, but the monetary authority is able to achieve the …rst-best allocation by setting i = i . It is well known that the quality-ladder model features both positive R&D externalities, such as the intertemporal spillover e¤ect and the consumer-surplus e¤ect, and negative R&D externalities, such as the business-stealing e¤ect. 19 Therefore, the equilibrium with i = 0 may feature either overinvestment or underinvestment in R&D. Comparing (27) with (24) under = 0, we see that i > 0 if and only if the equilibrium l r evaluated at i = 0 is greater than the optimal l r . In other words, R&D overinvestment in equilibrium is a necessary and su¢cient condition for Friedman rule to be suboptimal. We summarize these results in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3
Under inelastic labor supply, the optimal nominal interest rate i is given by (29) . If and only if R&D overinvestment occurs in the zero-nominal-interest-rate equilibrium, then the optimal nominal interest rate would be strictly positive; in this case, Friedman rule is suboptimal. 18 It is useful to note that l r > 0 is su¢cient to ensure that (1 + '= ) ln z > 1. 19 One could also introduce an additional negative externality in the form of an intratemporal duplication e¤ect as in Jones and Williams (2000) by assuming decreasing returns to scale in (13) (i.e., t = 'l r;t , where 0 < < 1) in order to expand the parameter space for R&D overinvestment. However, this additional feature would complicate our analysis, and the current framework that already features negative R&D externalities is su¢cient to illustrate our point.
Proof. Impose = 0 on (24) and compare with (27) . Then, a few steps of mathematical manipulation show that l r j i=0 > l r , i > 0.
Finally, as for the comparative statics of i , it is increasing in . Intuitively, a larger patent breadth increases R&D, which in turn implies that R&D overinvestment is more likely to occur, so that i increases. It is interesting to note that under inelastic labor supply, patent policy and monetary policy are perfectly substitutable in the sense that a lower interest rate has the same e¤ect as a larger patent breadth. Also, i is increasing in . When the discount rate is high, R&D overinvestment is more likely to occur, so that i increases. Furthermore, i is decreasing in ' and z. When R&D productivity ' is high or the step size z of innovation is large, R&D underinvestment is more likely to occur, so that i decreases.
Friedman rule under elastic labor supply
Under elastic labor supply, monetary policy a¤ects the supply of labor. Equation (22) shows that labor supply l is decreasing in i. Given that the nominal interest rate i now has a distortionary e¤ect on the consumption-leisure decision, optimal monetary policy no longer achieves the …rst-best allocation.
We …rst consider the case without the CIA constraint on consumption by setting = 0. Substituting (20)- (22) into (23) and di¤erentiating U with respect to i, we derive the optimal nominal interest rate i for = 0 given by
where is a composite parameter de…ned as follows.
It can be shown that l r > 0 is su¢cient for > 1. Therefore, Friedman rule is suboptimal (i.e., i > 0) if and only if > . It can also be shown that > is equivalent to R&D overinvestment (i.e., l r j i=0 > l r ). In other words, R&D overinvestment is necessary and su¢cient for Friedman rule to be suboptimal even with elastic labor supply so long as the CIA constraint on consumption is absent (i.e., = 0). It is useful to note that when the equilibrium features R&D overinvestment, setting i = i yields the …rst-best allocation of R&D labor (i.e., l r j i=i = l r ); however, setting i = i does not yield the …rst-best allocation of labor supply. Speci…cally, we …nd that lj i=i < l because the presence of a positive markup > 1 reduces the labor share of income and distorts the supply of labor. It can be shown that when i > 0, the inequality lj i=i < l simpli…es to > 1. We summarize these results in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4
When the CIA constraint on consumption is absent, R&D overinvestment is both necessary and su¢cient for Friedman rule to be suboptimal even with elastic labor supply. In this case, when the optimal nominal interest rate is positive, optimal monetary policy achieves the …rst-best allocation of R&D labor; however, it does not achieve the …rst-best allocation of labor supply.
Proof. Proven in text.
When the CIA constraint on consumption is present (i.e., > 0), there does not exist a closed-form solution for the optimal nominal interest rate i . In this case, we analyze whether Friedman rule is optimal. To do so, we substitute (20)- (22) into (23) and di¤erentiate U with respect to i. Then, evaluating @U=@i at i = 0 yields
which can be positive or negative depending on parameter values. Comparing (24) with (20) evaluated at i = 0, we …nd that l r j i=0 > l r is equivalent to the following inequality.
From (32) and (33), it is easy to see that when the CIA constraint on consumption is absent (i.e., = 0), R&D overinvestment (i.e., l r j i=0 > l r ) is both necessary and su¢cient for @U=@ij i=0 > 0, which implies that Friedman rule is suboptimal because social welfare is increasing in i at i = 0. However, when the CIA constraint on consumption is present (i.e., > 0), R&D overinvestment is no longer su¢cient for @U=@ij i=0 > 0; on the other hand, R&D underinvestment is su¢cient for @U=@ij i=0 < 0. In this case, the degree of R&D overinvestment must be substantial enough in order for Friedman rule to be suboptimal. Intuitively, in the presence of the CIA constraint on consumption, the nominal interest rate causes an additional distortionary e¤ect on the consumption-leisure decision. As a result of this additional distortion, R&D overinvestment is necessary but not su¢cient to justify a positive nominal interest rate. In other words, the suboptimality of Friedman rule requires that the welfare gain from overcoming R&D overinvestment through the CIA constraint on R&D dominates the welfare loss from distorting leisure through the CIA constraint on consumption. We summarize this result in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 When the CIA constraint on consumption is present, R&D overinvestment is necessary but not su¢cient for Friedman rule to be suboptimal. However, if the degree of R&D overinvestment is substantial enough, then Friedman rule would be suboptimal.
Proof. Comparing (32) and (33) shows that l r j i=0 > l r is necessary but not su¢cient for @U=@ij i=0 > 0. Suppose l r j i=0 = l r + , where > 0. There exists a threshold value such that if and only if > , then @U=@ij i=0 > 0. Furthermore, is given by
which is increasing in .
Friedman rule under alternative cases
In this section, we consider various alternative versions of the model. In Section 4.1, we examine an alternative case of the model in which only the CIA constraint on consumption is present. In Section 4.2, we examine another alternative case in which the model features CIA constraints on R&D and manufacturing. In Section 4.3, we consider a semi-endogenousgrowth version of the model.
Friedman rule under CIA on consumption only
In this subsection, we examine an alternative case in which the model features only the CIA constraint on consumption (but not the CIA constraint on R&D). In this case, (17) becomes
Combining this equation with (18) and (19) yields the equilibrium labor allocation given by
Substituting (35)-(37) into (23) and di¤erentiating U with respect to i yields
Equation (38) shows that welfare is monotonically decreasing in i; therefore, Friedman rule is always optimal when the CIA constraint on R&D investment is absent.
Proposition 6
When the Schumpeterian growth model features only the CIA constraint on consumption, Friedman rule is always optimal regardless of whether the equilibrium features R&D overinvestment or underinvestment.
Proof. Note (38).
Intuitively, under the CIA constraint on consumption, an increase in i decreases all of fl r ; l x ; lg. Furthermore, it can be shown that l r > 0 implies l > lj i=0 in (37); therefore, any increase in i that leads to a further reduction in l is socially suboptimal. Also, it is useful to note that the e¤ects of i on l r and l x under the two CIA constraints are very di¤erent. Recall that under the CIA constraint on R&D investment, an increase in i leads to a reallocation of labor from R&D to production, but this reallocation e¤ect of i is absent under the CIA constraint on consumption. From this analysis, we conclude that the CIA constraint on R&D, which is absent in previous studies, is crucial to the suboptimality of Friedman rule.
Friedman rule under CIA on manufacturing and R&D
In this subsection, we consider another alternative case in which the model features CIA constraints on manufacturing and R&D. For simplicity, we assume inelastic labor supply. To introduce a CIA constraint on manufacturing, we assume that the …nancing of wage payment to production workers also requires money borrowed from households. In this case, the total cost of wage payment is (1 + i t )w t L x;t (j), where 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, the marginal cost of production for the industry leader in industry j is mc t (j) = (1 + i t )w t =z qt(j) , and the markup is = p t (j)=mc t (j) as before. It can be shown that (9) remains unchanged whereas (10) becomes
As for the zero-expected-pro…t condition for R&D, we consider a more general CIA constraint on R&D such that (12) becomes
where 2 [0; 1]. The rest of the model is the same as Section 2.
Following similar derivations as in Section 2.6, we …nd that (17) becomes
Combining this equation with l x + l r = 1 and performing a few steps of mathematical manipulation yield
Therefore, we …nd that l r and g = (' ln z)l r are decreasing (increasing) in i if > ( < ). Intuitively, an increase in i raises both the cost of production and the cost of R&D; however, the relative strength of the opposing e¤ects of the CIA constraints is determined by and . The empirical evidence for a negative e¤ect of in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate on total factor productivity growth documented in Evers et al. (2007) implies that > ; in other words, R&D requires a higher …nancing cost than manufacturing.
As for the optimal nominal interest rate i , equating (42) and (24) under = 0 yields the following condition that characterizes the interior optimal nominal interest rate.
In this case, if > , then we come to the same conclusion that i > 0 if and only if the equilibrium features R&D overinvestment (i.e., > (1 + '= ) ln z). 20 However, if < , then we come to the opposite conclusion that i > 0 if and only if the equilibrium features R&D underinvestment (i.e., < (1 + '= ) ln z). 21 We summarize these results below. 20 In order for i to achieve the …rst-best allocation in this case, needs to be su¢ciently larger than such that > ( 1)=[(1 + '= ) ln z 1]. 21 In order for i to achieve the …rst-best allocation in this case, needs to be su¢ciently smaller than such that < ( 1)=[(1 + '= ) ln z 1].
Proposition 7
When there are CIA constraints on both R&D and production, R&D and economic growth are decreasing (increasing) in the nominal interest rate if > ( < ). Furthermore, if > ( < ), then R&D overinvestment (underinvestment) is necessary and su¢cient for Friedman rule to be suboptimal.
Proof. Note (42) and (43).
Friedman rule in a semi-endogenous growth model
In this subsection, we brie ‡y examine our results in a semi-endogenous growth model with only the CIA constraint on R&D; see Segerstrom (1998) for a semi-endogenous-growth version of the quality-ladder model. For simplicity, we focus on the case of inelastic labor supply by setting = 0, so that l r + l x = l = 1. To introduce semi-endogenous growth, we assume an e¤ect of increasing complexity on innovation such that R&D productivity is decreasing in aggregate technology Z t . In this case, (13) becomes
Under this speci…cation, the steady-state growth rate of Z t is determined by the exogenous population growth rate such that g = n > 0. The rest of the model is the same as Section 2.
Following similar derivations as in Section 2.6, we …nd that equilibrium R&D labor is characterized by l r 1 l r = 1
where = g= ln z = n= ln z is exogenous on the balanced growth path. Equation (45) shows that equilibrium R&D l r is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i as before. Using standard dynamic optimization, we maximize (1) subject to (a) c t = Z t l x;t , (b) _ Z t = (' ln z)l r;t N t , and (c) l r;t + l x;t = 1. We …nd that the …rst-best optimal allocation on the balanced growth path is characterized by l r 1 l r = n + n .
Equating (45) and (46) yields the optimal nominal interest rate i given by i = max ( 1) + + n n 1; 0 ,
where = n= ln z. Therefore, we come to the same conclusion in the monetary semiendogenous growth model that Friedman rule is suboptimal (i.e., i > 0) if and only if the equilibrium features R&D overinvestment (i.e., l r j i=0 > l r ).
Proposition 8
In a semi-endogenous growth model with a CIA constraint on R&D investment and inelastic labor supply, the optimal nominal interest rate i is given by (47). Furthermore, if and only if R&D overinvestment occurs in the zero-nominal-interest-rate equilibrium, then the optimal nominal interest rate would be strictly positive; in this case, Friedman rule is suboptimal.
Proof. Compare (45) with (46). Then, a few steps of mathematical manipulation show that l r j i=0 > l r , i > 0.
Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the long-run growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy in a Schumpeterian growth model with CIA constraints. Although we …nd that R&D and economic growth are decreasing in the nominal interest rate, a zero interest rate policy does not necessarily maximize social welfare. Speci…cally, we …nd that the suboptimality or optimality of Friedman rule is closely related to a seemingly unrelated issue that is the overinvestment versus underinvestment of R&D in the market economy, and this result is robust to both the fully-endogenous-growth and semi-endogenous-growth versions of the Schumpeterian model.
Finally, we conclude with a brief summary of our results and their intuition. Under inelastic labor supply, the CIA constraint on consumption has no distortionary e¤ect on the consumption-leisure decision; therefore, any e¤ect of monetary policy operates through the CIA constraint on R&D investment. If and only if there is too much R&D in equilibrium, then a positive nominal interest rate that increases the cost of R&D would be optimal. Under elastic labor supply, the CIA constraint on consumption distorts the consumption-leisure decision; as a result, a positive nominal interest rate leads to a welfare cost through a reduction in labor supply. In this case, R&D overinvestment is necessary but not su¢cient for a positive nominal interest rate to be optimal. In other words, in order for a positive nominal interest rate to be optimal (i.e., Friedman rule being suboptimal), the welfare gain from overcoming R&D overinvestment through the CIA constraint on R&D must dominate the welfare loss from distorting leisure through the CIA constraint on consumption. Furthermore, we consider an alternative version of the model with CIA constraints on R&D and manufacturing. In this case, we …nd that the optimality of Friedman rule depends on the relative strength of the CIA constraints on R&D and manufacturing. If the e¤ect of the CIA constraint on manufacturing dominates (is dominated by) the e¤ect of the CIA constraint on R&D, then R&D underinvestment (overinvestment) would become a necessary and su¢cient condition for Friedman rule to be suboptimal.
